The 1952-1961 DeSoto Disaster

From Stodgy to Racy – How could DeSoto sell more of those dull and staid ’52s versus those slick 1960s?
Blame Corporate inattention, lax management, division greed, and just plain stupidity.

Chrysler’s upper-mid price car is sacrificed for more Dodge and Chrysler sales. But did it work?

DeSoto, like many brands that floundered in the late 1950s – Edsel, Hudson, Packard, Kaiser, Willys, and even Studebaker fell due to internal decisions and events that were unanticipated across the entire industry

DeSoto’s issues are similar to the other, but different enough to warrant discussion. Unlike Hudson and Packard, DeSoto had launched a modern OHV Hemi V-8 in 1952, putting them ahead of the curve over long-lived makes such as Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Ford, Lincoln and Mercury – and even sister brands Dodge and Plymouth. They were as solid engineering-wise.  And perhaps most important, they had even more horsepower than the touted Oldsmobile, their key competitor. (Horsepower was a big selling factor in the period 1951-1955).

By 1956, when the horsepower-styling playing field was more even, they scooped all mid-price brands by deploying the Adventurer, a true brother to the mighty Chrysler 300. Key, by then, their stodgy styling was gone and, performance and models offered were on a par with everyone. Frankly, they were positioned well, both by price and reputation.

But by 1961, they were gone.  What happened?

Bad Corporate Management – Chrysler’s Lose Control of Brands

One thing that both GM and Ford had done (up until the Recession) was to control the price point of each of their brands. We don’t need to belabor it here, but their was a hierarchy in those two brands with, at GM Chevrolet at the bottom, rising up to Cadillac at the top – and at Ford the levels Form the brand’s namesake through Mercury and to Lincoln.  (It was the confusion of where Edsel fit that helped its demise, BTW).

At Chrysler, back in the 30s, the place for DeSoto started out as a bridge between Plymouth and Chrysler, was at first below Dodge when it was acquired, then later shifted up to below Chrysler. After WW II, most people saw DeSoto as a less expensive Chrysler, and unfortunately, the brand was too similar to the senior car in every aspect, in body size, styling, and powertrains. Its price point was also suspect, with the lowest DeSoto falling under the highest-priced Dodge and its highest overstepping the lowest priced Chrysler. If brand managers thought they could sell a competitive model with any of the other Chrysler Corp’s brands, they were allowed to proceed.

This was further exacerbated by Dodge during the mid -50s moving their top level models into almost direct competition with DeSoto’s mid-priced brands and having DeSoto use Dodge chassis and running gear for it low-priced entries. At Chrysler, the Windsor competed directly with the DeSoto Fireflite, and even under priced some models!

The public’s perception of DeSoto as an over-priced Dodge, and of a poor sister to Chrysler, gained momentum. When Dodge complained that rebodying Dodges as DeSotos (including running gear) was stealing sales, Chrysler forced DeSoto to increase prices on that model, further increasing the perception.

Too Much Similarity Where Brands Intersected

Each and every manufacturer had what we’ll call “brand to brand intersections”. That is to say, for example, that a high-end Ford would intersect with a low-end Mercury from a price point of view, with the lower end Mercury usually offering perhaps a longer wheelbase and more interior room.  Even today, manufacturers spend copious amounts of marketing dollars convincing the public that as you move up the corporate brand line, you are achieving more status by driving the higher level brand. This was very true back in the 50s and resulted in the plethora of brand and models offered by the manufacturers.

However, when you have fewer brands, those intersections are going to be more obvious.  History always set up Plymouth as the brand of the working man – in every way similar to Ford and Chevrolet. And  Chrysler was always thought of as a top line brand, competing with Buick and entry-level Cadillacs.

But Dodge and DeSoto, competing with Mercury at Ford, and Pontiac and Oldsmobile at GM had a more serious marketing problem. Specifically, if they competed with Mercury why was the need for two brands?  If they competed with GM, did DeSoto fully fill the niche occupied by Oldsmobile, or did it fall short – not having a car that competed with the 98 model?

Worse, Dodge Royal line was a direct competitor to all of the the DeSoto line and DeSoto’s Firesweep was not only a badge-engineered Dodge, but it competed with Dodge’s mid-price models.

When Ford launched the Edsel, Chrysler saw it going head to head with either Dodge or DeSoto (even Ford couldn’t decide which) and when it failed, the message was clear – to compete with Ford, we don’t need one of our brands and since DeSoto sold less cars than Dodge, well, well we don’t need DeSoto.

The Great Recession of 1957-1961

Few know that the 1957-1961 Recession period had the mighty GM considering merging Pontiac into Chevrolet and Oldsmobile into Buick. We also know that launching the Edsel in the midst of this recession ended that brand before it really got started. And Chrysler . . . well that takes us to DeSoto.

Chrysler, always the lesser sister of what was called “the Big Three”, had total sales that trailed GM and Ford by perhaps 30% in most years. However, they were profitable in the areas where they chose to compete, The Corporation had more brands than Ford and less than GM, but they fell in areas that attracted a loyal following.

DeSoto’s niche was somewhat between Pontiac and Oldsmobile at GM and competed directly with the top end of the Mercury line. Sales ran from a low of about 85 thousand to, in great years, 150. This continued through 1957, with solid years in the boom period 1955-57.

With the recession, car sales across the board fell, starting with 1958. DeSoto sales dropped to 40%!  There just weren’t enough sales to warrant all the different components unique to each brand.  And Dodge, who was also struggling, pointed out that if the low priced and Dodge-sourced DeSoto Firesweep were eliminated, those sales and the production would likely go to Dodge and bolster their numbers. Firesweep constituted one half of DeSoto’s 1958 sales.

Chrysler, who was suffering as well, with a 50% drop, saw the top end of DeSoto as a way to  augment the Windsor line, that sat on the same chassis as the Fireflite. They felt that eliminating the top end DeSoto would draw buyers to their stores.

Unlike GM, who had so much invested in their mid-price brands (Pontiac and Oldsmobile) tooling for separate engines and transmissions and sheetmetal, where canceling a brand would have collapsed supply chain, factories, and work force, DeSoto in tis year, had adopted similarly structured unit bodies, a corporate line of engines and transmissions, and peripheral equipment and interiors where all either supplied by the same aftermarket, or were merely a choice of paint and materials. While this helped reduce costs, it also made chopping out a model or brand easy.

Ford, who operated similar to Chrysler, also had an easier choice. The death of Edsel was s huge  loss, but from a manufacturing and supply chain point of view, easy to suffer. When Chrysler saw that Ford was willing to throw away a car that would have competed directly with DeSoto, they realized that they had no choice.

The die was cast. By 1961, DeSoto was gone, Dodge picked up the 20,000 low-end DeSoto line, and Chrysler launched the Newport, basically a DeSoto with different trim. The Newport accounted for over 40% of Chrysler sales that year and saved the brand.

Accepting Defeat, and Turning It Into Victory

None of the big three would have been willing to admit that they had overstepped their bounds with brands and models, but the Recession did one thing, it punished each and every manufacturer just about equally. It also publicized the woes of the auto industry, allowing all manufacturers an excuse to dump brands.

Like Edsel, DeSoto was redundant. And like Packard and Hudson, it didn’t have a large enough loyal following. It was much to easy for Dodge and Chrysler to absorb the Brand and move on. At least Chrysler didn’t have to eat the huge investment of Edsel.

“Tightening our belts” seemed like a great idea in 1960-61, and the public bought in wholeheartedly.

New Lines, New Cars and an a Whole New Market

Frankly, the loss of DeSoto made little waves by the time it was gone – by 1960 they sold 26 thousand cars, an afterthought in the total auto sales that year. When it was put out of it’s misery in 1961, all eyes had already turned to the new “compact car”, and  Corvair, Falcon, and Valiant were creating all the headlines. When the “mid-size” Comet, Lancer, Tempest, F-85, and Special arrived in this year, there was hardly enough headlines space to even mention DeSoto’s demise. See: “Epitaph for DeSoto” from Car Life magazine”.  The beat goes on . . .